News

Dear Partners,
Please be aware of Mr. Dan William representative of the company Tele-Com Asia LTD. They owe us (Primo Teh d.o.o) 3279,62 USD.
Two days after we sent them the first invoice their billing department sent us a false wire copy that the invoice amount has been payed. We never got this payment.
In the meantime we sent them one more invoice and we closed the route on them. When we requested for the both invoices to be payed we received an email from sales (signed by Dan William) explaining us that Dan William commited a fraud inside the company and disappeared. When they recover money they will pay us the invoices. They have not done that, we are still waiting...
 
Contact detail: Dan William (sales director)
Skype : live:william.hk00852
E-mails: sales@telecomasiahk.com, ceo@telecomasiahk.com, billing@telecomasiahk.com, support@telecomasiahk.com
IP Address: 167.160.181.77, 173.254.242.234
Company name: Telecom- Asia Ltd.
Address: Unit 428, 7/F., Alliance Commercial Bldg, 133 Connaught Road, Central, Hong Kong
Web: www.telecomasiahk.com
Director: Lucas Smith

Hi,  we are a victim of a 'Twin' company.
We have been informed that a fraudster is finalizing fake interconnections contracts under our brand VueTel.
They send traffic, cumulate a debit protected by our reputation and never pay the outstanding.
We have a proof of a contract made by VueTel Italia LTD, registered in Italy under the same address of Vuetel Italia Spa.
Signatures and stamps are obviously fake as well.
They use emails under the domain vue-tel.com which IS NOT belonging to VueTel Italia.
The fraudster also cloned our official Website.
Please consider as valid only the following domains:
vue-tele.com (obsolete), vuetelitalia.it, vuetel.com
The fraudster is sending traffic from the IP: 67.229.139.66

Dear Colleagues,
Please be aware of Pramoscom s.r.o., the company previously known as Albermare.
They owe us (Lexico Telecom Ltd.) 17572.88 USD. We have sent many e-mails and messages to them but there is no response from Pramoscom team yet.
 
Below are their contact details:
Address: Praha 2, Nove Mesto, Legerova 1820/39, 12000, CZECH REPUBLIC
Director: Gennady Zubkov
Email: g.zubkov@pra-mos.com
Skype ID: zgennady

We are looking for anyone who can help us with offsetting. For details, please contact:
eva@lexico-voip.com.

Dear VoIP Partners and VOIP circle,
beware of Fastel Communication (CEO & Owner: Ehab Sabet) for pending payment and lies and not answering our calls, e-mails or imo, whatsapp viber etc… They are blocking us (GEM Group Services LTD.) wherever we talk to Ehab.
Their due to us is 4500$ and they promised to open Cuba and Tunisia and Egypt routes for us with no success… Then Mr. Ehab Sabet said he will pay on Sunday 1000$ then on Monday 2000$ and balance of 1500$ on Thursday. He blocked us and informed a common person we both know Ehab that his customer Cost Master did not pay him the invoice of 7700$ and he is not answering and delaying the payment for us and we did not get any $ from him and when you ask him he say: "Please hold I will open route", and on testing we get a FAS route …

Dear Partners,
please be aware of Nas Point Communications, LLC. based in 1818 SW. 1st avenue 1014, Miami FL,33129.
The main contact is Edward Sosa. He owes us (Axistel Fze) $ 6053.82 from Feb 2016.
Nas Point Communications, LLC. ignoring our e-mails and not responding at all.
 
Site: www.naspoint.com.co
Address: 1818 SW. 1st avenue 1014, Miami FL,33129
IP: 107.6.19.250
E-mails: esosa@naspoint.com.co; commercialgroup@naspoint.com.co; billing@naspoint.com.co
Tel.: +1 786-228-8720

Dear partners,
please be aware of AMITG / Telcoglobe.
We worked with this company since Q2 2014 and up till September 2016 all payments were done promptly. In September, they started one dispute, which was based on their manager`s issue.  Alongside this, they declined to make payment until the dispute was concluded. As this was a clear sign of some issues, to be able to collect at least part of the amount we accepted for the latter to be split 50/50. It is important to mention that the issue was based on a negligence from their manager`s side.
We received partial payment in October after which the amount due was ~15K. We had one route open which we managed to offset the amount down to 3K on ASR of 1% and below.
Last month this route dropped and we started to request some other route or payment, but we got only reply that they have no active routes, and the promise that if they recover, they will cover the amount due. This is a think, that we highly doubt.
Our point of contact was Mr. Avinash Sharma - www.linkedin.com/in/avinash-sharma-31145059/
His e-mail is -  finance@telcoglobe.com
Currently they do not reply to our e-mails and phone calls.

Please be aware of Etor Gomez - a fraud person in the market using Voxbridge LP's information for different interconnections. Please do not get involved with this person - pay attention to domain VOXBRIDGE LP use ONLY @voxb.com.
Do not move forward until you get confirmation from our TR companies with our real managers CC-ed. We would highly appreciate if you kindly shared any information on this fraud if any.
Below you can find all the info this person provides along with our real info that should be alarming for you:
Contact name – Etor Gomez
Emails: sales2@voxbrdge.com; info@voxbrdge.com
IP - 45.32.205.147
Skype ID: live:mphouasun
 
Contact us directly if you have any suspicion:
Email: info@voxb.com, billing@voxb.com
Phone number: 442038070039 ext. 356

Dear Partners,
please be aware of Yutele Technology based in Unit 04,7/F,Bright Way Tower,No.33  Mong KoK Road,KowLoon,HongKong (IPs: 68.68.105.138; 69.46.67.90; 210.83.70.189; 47.89.36.182).
The main contact is Davin (e-mail: davin@yutele.com, Skype ID: yutele.davin).
Yutele owes us (Axistel Fze) $ 1170.90 from June 2015.

Dear Partners,
We would like to warn you against company Pure Minutes Bilateral Group LLC, who owe us $36381.04 since March 2016. Please find their contacts and debt details below.
Pure Minutes Bilateral  Group, LLC
45 Broadway, Suite # 1440 New York, NY 10006
Eric Ramos, President
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/pureminutes1/
David Cooper, CEO
e-mail: dmc@pureminutes.com
Marat Grinberg, Managing Director
e-mail: marat@pureminutes.com
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/marat-grinberg-48530b68/
 
We firstly interconnected with this company in Aug 2015 on conditions of 7 net 7 billing, $3000 as a minimum payment and $10000 of credit limit based on the agreed business case. The company did not have any payment problems from the start and arranged 5 timely payments, until March 2016 when current debt emerged.
The due amount was accumulated for only two days in the beginning of March 2016, when traffic rocketed, so that balance exceeded the Credit Limit by 5 times and we were forced to block them.
 

Dear Partners,
There has been a surge of phishing attacks on VoIP companies employees recently, and we want to share our preventive security recommendations to keep your VoIP business safe. Intrusion attempts follow a pattern of gaining user's access credentials in order to get access to VoIP platforms user works with.

In few words, phishing is a term for attack aimed at gaining access to user's logins and passwords by messages, links or files pretending to not be what they actually are. The most common type of phishing is e-mail/IM-based one, involving malicious executable file attached. File can be sent from both unknown sender or from account of already compromised contact - it is often disguised as rate sheet or interconnection offer.

Warning! Typical malicious file is an executable - script with ".wsf" or ".vbs" extension (or even less exotic ".ps1", ".bat") - opening such file without knowing its contents is extremely dangerous. Don't let its name fool you, these files can't ever contain rate sheet data or office document of some sort. Once run, it registers itself in OS and listens to user actions and sends application data to attacker (finds e-mail access credentials, contacts, browser history, etc.).
With all of that, hacker is able to use acquired data to login into users' accounts in different systems. The main attack vector is VoIP companies employees since intruder has specific intention of adding third-party IP addresses into routing settings to send fraud traffic, so the whole scheme is designed to work this way. After one attack is successful, he is trying to spread the exploit by sending it to other people from user's contacts hoping they'll be careless enough to accept and open the file.